منابع مشابه
Algorithms for Destructive Shift Bribery
We study the complexity of Destructive Shift Bribery. In this problem, we are given an election with a set of candidates and a set of voters (ranking the candidates from best to worst, each), a despised candidate d (typically, one of the current winners), a budget B, and prices for shifting d down in voters’ rankings. The goal is to ensure that d is not a winner of the election. We show that th...
متن کاملComplexity of Shift Bribery in Committee Elections
We study the (parameterized) complexity of SHIFT BRIBERY for multiwinner voting rules. We focus on the SNTV, Bloc, k-Borda, and Chamberlin-Courant, as well as on approximate variants of the Chamberlin-Courant rule, since the original rule is NP-hard to compute. We show that SHIFT BRIBERY tends to be significantly harder in the multiwinner setting than in the single-winner one by showing setting...
متن کاملLarge-Scale Election Campaigns: Combinatorial Shift Bribery
We study the complexity of a combinatorial variant of the Shift Bribery problem in elections. In the standard Shift Bribery problem, we are given an election where each voter has a preference order over the set of candidates and where an outside agent, the briber, can pay each voter to rank the briber’s favorite candidate a given number of positions higher. The goal is to ensure the victory of ...
متن کاملPrices Matter for the Parameterized Complexity of Shift Bribery
In the Shift Bribery problem, we are given an election (based on preference orders), a preferred candidate p, and a budget. The goal is to ensure p’s victory by shifting p higher in some voters’ preference orders. However, each such shift request comes at a price (depending on the voter and on the extent of the shift) and we must not exceed the given budget. We study the parameterized computati...
متن کاملOften Harder than in the Constructive Case: Destructive Bribery in CP-nets
We study the complexity of the destructive bribery problem—an external agent tries to prevent a disliked candidate from winning by bribery actions— in voting over combinatorial domains, where the set of candidates is the Cartesian product of several issues. This problem is related to the concept of the margin of victory of an election which constitutes a measure of robustness of the election ou...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1387-2532,1573-7454
DOI: 10.1007/s10458-019-09403-3