Algorithms for Closed Under Rational Behavior (CURB) Sets
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Algorithms for Closed Under Rational Behavior (CURB) Sets
We provide a series of algorithms demonstrating that solutions according to the fundamental game-theoretic solution concept of closed under rational behavior (CURB) sets in two-player, normal-form games can be computed in polynomial time (we also discuss extensions to n-player games). First, we describe an algorithm that identifies all of a player’s best responses conditioned on the belief that...
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Significant work has been done on computational aspects of solving games under various solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, and (iterated) dominance. However, the fundamental concepts of rationalizability and CURB (Closed Under Rational Behavior) sets have not, to our knowledge, been studied from a computational perspective. Firs...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1076-9757
DOI: 10.1613/jair.3070