Alethic Reference
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Alethic fictionalism, alethic nihilism, and the Liar Paradox
Recently, several philosophers have proposed fictionalist accounts of truthtalk, as a means for resolving the semantic pathology that the Liar Paradox appears to present. These alethic fictionalists aim to vindicate truth-talk as a kind of as if discourse, while rejecting that the talk attributes any real property of truth. Liggins (Analysis 74:566–574, 2014) has recently critically assessed on...
متن کاملA Non-Alethic Approach to Faultless Disagreement
This paper motivates and describes a non-alethic approach to faultless disagreement involving predicates of personal taste (PPTs). In section 1 I describe problems faced by Sundell’s (2011) indexicalist approach, and MacFarlane’s (2014) relativist approach. In section 2 I develop an alternative, non-alethic, approach. The non-alethic approach is broadly expressivist in that it endorses both the...
متن کاملProofs and Expressiveness in Alethic Modal Logic
The above dictionary characterization of alethic modalities states the central notions of alethic modal logic: necessity, and other notions that are usually thought of as being definable in terms of necessity and Boolean negation: impossibility, contingency, and possibility. The syntax of modal propositional logic is inductively defined over a denumerable set of sentence letters p0, p1, p2, . ....
متن کاملAlethic Functionalism and the Norm of Belief
A common objection to deflationism is that it is unable to account for the normative import of truth as a norm for assertion and belief. Most of the versions of truth pluralism agree, against deflationsim that the normativity of truth is a substantive feature of it. Alethic functionalism, as defended by Lynch (2009) includes it among the platitudes characteristic of the role of truth which are ...
متن کاملSemantic Paradox and Alethic Undecidability Forthcoming in Analysis
In TM, the term non-alethic facts means facts that have nothing to do with the truth or falsity of sentences, like the fact that snow is white. The solution I propose works this way. Call being grounded the property a sentence S has when it has a truthor falsity-maker that is a non-alethic fact, and ungrounded the property S has when it lacks such a truthor falsitymaker. A common view about par...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Philosophical Logic
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0022-3611,1573-0433
DOI: 10.1007/s10992-019-09524-w