aIR-Jumper: Covert air-gap exfiltration/infiltration via security cameras & infrared (IR)
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
aIR-Jumper: Covert Air-Gap Exfiltration/Infiltration via Security Cameras & Infrared (IR)
Infrared (IR) light is invisible to humans, but cameras are optically sensitive to this type of light. In this paper, we show how attackers can use surveillance cameras and infrared light to establish bi-directional covert communication between the internal networks of organizations and remote attackers. We present two scenarios: exfiltration (leaking data out of the network) and infiltration (...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Computers & Security
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0167-4048
DOI: 10.1016/j.cose.2018.11.004