Aggregation of coarse preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Aggregation of coarse preferences
We consider weak preference orderings over a set An of n alternatives. An individual preference is of refinement ≤ n if it first partitions An into subsets of ‘tied’ alternatives, and then ranks these subsets within a linear ordering. When < n, preferences are coarse. It is shown that, if the refinement of preferences does not exceed , a super majority rule (within non-abstaining voters) with r...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2001
ISSN: 0176-1714
DOI: 10.1007/pl00007182