Aggregating sets of von Neumann–Morgenstern utilities
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Aggregating sets of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities
We analyze the aggregation problem without the assumption that individuals and society have fully determined and observable preferences. More precisely, we endow individuals and society with sets of possible von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions over lotteries. We generalize the classical neutrality assumption to this setting and characterize the class of neutral social welfare function. Th...
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The concern of this paper is the aggregation of sets of rationally connected judgments that the members of a group individually endorse into a corresponding, collectively endorsed set of judgments. After documenting the need for various groups to aggregate judgments, we explain how this task is challenged by the "doctrinal" or "discursive" paradox. We then show that this paradox is not just an ...
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Given a society confronting a set of alternatives A, we consider the aggregation of individual preferences over the power set A of A into a social preference over A. In case we allow individuals to have any complete and transitive preference over A, Arrow’s impossibility theorem naturally applies. However, the Arrovian impossibility prevails, even when the set of admissible preferences over A i...
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Relative Nash welfarism is a solution to the problem of aggregating von NeumannMorgenstern preferences over a set of lotteries. It ranks such lotteries according to the product of any collection of 0—normalized von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities they generate. We show that this criterion is characterized by the Weak Pareto Principle, Anonymity, and Independence of Harmless Expansions: the social...
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The “doctrinal paradox” or “discursive dilemma” shows that propositionwise majority voting over the judgments held by multiple individuals on some interconnected propositions can lead to inconsistent collective judgments on these propositions. List and Pettit (2002) have proved that this paradox illustrates a more general impossibility theorem showing that there exists no aggregation procedure ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.018