Agentic preferences: a foundation for nudging when preferences are endogenous

Abstract Since the publication of seminal book Nudge by Thaler and Sunstein, several critics have highlighted preference endogeneity as a serious obstacle to nudging. When individuals hold preferences that are dynamic endogenous nudge frame, it is unclear what normative benchmark for libertarian paternalistic policies should be. While acknowledging this issue, pro-nudging camp has not yet sufficiently addressed it. This article aims fill void presenting conditional defence nudging when endogenous. We explain learning process through which establish ‘agentic’ preferences: stable, reasonable, autonomous associated with organismic well-being ground ‘welfare’ principle paternalism. To describe process, we draw on theories from psychological science, in particular self-discrepancy theory self-determination theory. argue agentic only welfare-relevant thus appropriate paternalism but can also be identified choice architects.