Agency Issues and Financing Constraints - Evidence from REITs

Inside Ownership, Agency Costs and Equity Valuation: Evidence from REITs

We investigate relations between inside ownership, managerial expenses and equity valuations. Our engine of analysis —Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) —provides a unique and rich framework for analysis since we can calculate extremely accurate measures of asset replacement costs, and hence relative valuation (Tobin's Q). Further, the nature of the financial statements allows us to examine ...

A Quantitative Dynamic Agency Model of Financing Constraints

Recent theoretical research in corporate finance has highlighted the role of incentive problems between firms’ investors and insiders in determining corporations’ financial structures, dynamics and investment policies. Financial contracts are designed to mitigate these agency conflicts. However, most of the analysis is qualitative in nature. This paper develops a dynamic firm model in order to ...

Financing Constraints and Entrepreneurship

Imperfect Competition, Agency, and Financing Decisions∗

We examine in a Cournot duopoly model the well known view that short-term capital market debt can control managerial moral hazard. We show that short-term debt does not provide this discipline because of management’s manipulation of the information flow to the market. Shareholders may nevertheless prefer short-term debt because it motivates management to be more aggressive in the product market...

Entrepreneurship Financing and Nation Building in Nigeria: Evidence from Agricultural Small and Medium Scale Enterprises

An attempt has been made in this study to examine the relationship between entrepreneurship financing from the perspective of agricultural small and medium scale enterprises and nation building in Nigeria from 1990 to 2017. Data were collected from the Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin with the application of Autoregressive Distributed Lagged and Bounds test to address the objective ...