African Countries Sign Environmental Agreements
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Case of two Self-Enforcing International Agreements for Environmental Protection with Asymmetric Countries
Non-cooperative game theoretical models of self-enforcing international environmental agreements (IEAs) that employ the cartel stability concept of d’Aspremont et al. (1983) frequently assume that countries are identical, and they can sign a single agreement only. We modify the assumption by considering two self-enforcing IEAs and also two types of asymmetric countries. Extending a model of Bar...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Environmental Conservation
سال: 1981
ISSN: 0376-8929,1469-4387
DOI: 10.1017/s0376892900027314