Affirmative action subcontracting regulations in dynamic procurement auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Entry and Subcontracting in Public Procurement Auctions
We empirically study how the interplay between entry and subcontracting choices is affected by the use of different auctions formats in public procurement. The differencein-differences strategy used exploits a dataset of auctions for public works run alternately under first price and average bid auctions. We find that the use of first price auctions causes a marked decline in both entry and sub...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Industrial Organization
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0167-7187
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102657