Affiliation, integration, and information: ownership incentives and industry structure
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Ownership Incentives and Industry Structure
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Industrial Economics
سال: 2004
ISSN: 0022-1821,1467-6451
DOI: 10.1111/j.0022-1821.2004.00223.x