Affective Reason

Reason and Desire: the Case of Affective Desires

The paper begins with an objection to the DesireBased Reasons Model. The argument from reason-based desires holds that since desires are based on reasons (first premise), which they transmit but to which they cannot add (second premise), they cannot themselves provide reasons for action. In the paper I investigate an attack that has recently been launched against the first premise of this argum...

Learning to Reason: a Reason!-able Approach

How are general informal reasoning skills acquired? Little research has been done on this topic. Two hypotheses dominate. According to the strong situated learning hypothesis, there are no general informal reasoning skills (only contextor domainspecific skills) and so nothing can be done to improve them. According to the practice hypothesis, general informal reasoning can be improved through in...

Distorting Reason

When No Reason For Is A Reason Against

We provide a Bayesian justification of the idea that, under certain conditions, the absence of an argument in favour of the truth of a hypothesis H constitutes a good argument against the truth of H.

Dynamics of Reason-Book

published by CSLI Publications. ©2001 by CSLI Publications. All rights reserved. This text may be used and shared in accordance with the fair-use provisions of U.S. copyright law, and it may be archived and redistributed in electronic form, provided that this entire notice, including copyright information, is carried and provided that CSLI Publications is notified and no fee is charged for acce...