Advocacy in European Civil Societies: Organizational Trade-offs Between Selective and Collective Incentive Provision

Abstract Civil society organizations (CSOs) are a cornerstone of democracy in Europe. Nonetheless, “civil society” and “political should not be equated as membership-based necessarily politically engaged. This paper theorizes empirically examines which CSOs engage interest representation through sustained advocacy activity. We propose an incentive-theoretical framework on CSO investments activities—a collective, non-exclusive incentive from also non-members can profit—by fundamentally dependent member support. Theorizing how CSOs' own structural characteristics, resource dependencies, government demand for input affect reconcile selective collective provision, we test our hypotheses using new data four recent surveys conducted European democracies. In line with framework, organizing individual citizens rather than corporate actors those pursuing interests less likely to advocacy, while professionalization state funding access enhance CSOs’ propensities do so. Furthermore, the analysis shows that former characteristics similarly relevant across distinct country settings, role variables is mediated by institutional context revealing important source inequality democratic representation.