Adverse Selection and Partial Exclusive Dealing
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Adverse Selection and Partial Exclusive Dealing
I reconcile a disagreement in the literature regarding the impact of downstream price competition on anticompetitive exclusive dealing, and then extend the exclusive dealing literature to accommodate adverse selection. Adverse selection expands the scope of inefficient exclusion, and may also explain policies of partial exclusion, in which an incumbent profits by locking up select retailers eve...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2018933