Administrative Sabotage

نویسندگان

چکیده

Government can sabotage itself. From the president’s choice of agency heads to budgets, regulations, and litigating positions, presidents their appointees have undermined very programs they administer. But why would an try put itself out business? And how agencies that are subject array political legal checks statutory programs? This Article offers account “what, why, how” administrative answers those questions. It contends reflects a distinct mode action is more permanent, destructive, democratically illegitimate than more-studied forms maladministration. In contrast shirks its duties or drifts away from Congress’s policy goals, one engaged in aims deliberately kill nullify program it administers. Agencies because ask them to. Facing pressure dismantle environment where securing legislation Congress difficult politically costly, pursue retrenchment through state. Building on this positive theory sabotage, considers responses. The best response, contends, not reforms cross-cutting body law structures most action. Rather, risk better managed changes designed. choices about leadership, concentration dispersal authority implement programs, breadth delegations, other matters influence likelihood will succeed fail. When lawmakers create modify federal should design be less vulnerable by administer them.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Michigan Law Review

سال: 2022

ISSN: ['1939-8557', '0026-2234']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36644/mlr.120.5.administrative