Administrative delegation revisited: Experimental evidence on the behavioural consequences of public service motivation and risk aversion

Getting a grip on issues of administrative delegation is key to the performance public organizations. The oversight game models as conflict interest between an inspector and inspectee act in interests former. This study tests alternative solutions overcome ‘shirking’ game. Specifically, we test effect external incentives, implied by game-theoretical solution, against role intrinsic factors, namely, service motivation job-related risk aversion. Evidence from laboratory ( N = 208) survey experiment 794) show that both approach, which inspired new management, motivation, its antithesis, fail explain subjects’ behaviour. Instead, aversion makes more less likely. finding hints towards differentiated view employees’ attitudes improve delegation. Points for practitioners promise management disappear with setting appropriate extrinsic incentives too simplistic. Public other hand, started antithesis self-interested bureaucrat, also fails solve issue appears delegation, presents remarkable counterpoint popular opinion problematic organizations’ performance. Rather than avoid selecting risk-averse employees generally, attention might be paid domains decision-making such traits can beneficial.