Adaptationism and Trait Individuation
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract Adaptationism is often taken to be the thesis that most traits are adaptations. In order assess this thesis, it seems we must able establish either an exhaustive set of all or a representative sample set. Either task requires more systematic and principled way individuating than currently available. Moreover, different trait individuation criteria can make adaptationism turn out true false. For instance, based on natural selection may render true, but do so by presupposing adaptationism. paper, show how depends latter open unsolved problem.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Philosophy of Science
سال: 2023
ISSN: ['0031-8248', '1539-767X']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.28