Adaptation Effectiveness and Free-Riding Incentives in International Environmental Agreements
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Part Two: The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes Problem Structure, Institutional Design, and the Relative Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements
Assessing the relative effectiveness of international environmental agreements accurately requires careful attention to the structures of the problems they address. Although even studies of single agreements would beneat by evaluating the inouence of problem structure, problem structure poses particularly large analytic challenges for scholars interested in the relative effectiveness of environ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1957996