ACTIVE VS. PASSIVE DEFENSE AGAINST A STRATEGIC ATTACKER
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Tax Avoidance and Institutional Ownership: Active vs. Passive Ownership
Income tax is one of the most important costs of companies and it is usually considered as a cost that should not be paid. One of the most noticeable and influential factors in tax avoidance is corporate ownership structure. With an emphasis on institutional ownership and its types in this paper, it is attempted to measure the effect of this ownership and its types on corporate tax avoidance. F...
متن کاملActive vs Passive Training for Educational Software
Computer-based instructional interventions are increasingly popular in classroom curricula. For students to benefit from these interventions, it is vital that they are properly trained to use the software. We investigate the effects of using active versus passive training techniques to familiarize users with a graphical programming environment, Alice. We examine the impact using measures of kno...
متن کاملWalkie-Talkie: An Efficient Defense Against Passive Website Fingerprinting Attacks
Website fingerprinting (WF) is a traffic analysis attack that allows an eavesdropper to determine the web activity of a client, even if the client is using privacy technologies such as proxies, VPNs, or Tor. Recent work has highlighted the threat of website fingerprinting to privacy-sensitive web users. Many previously designed defenses against website fingerprinting have been broken by newer a...
متن کاملWalkie-Talkie: An Efficient Defense Against Passive Website Fingerprinting Attacks
Website fingerprinting (WF) is a traffic analysis attack that allows an eavesdropper to determine the web activity of a client, even if the client is using privacy technologies such as proxies, VPNs, or Tor. Recent work has highlighted the threat of website fingerprinting to privacy-sensitive web users. Many previously designed defenses against website fingerprinting have been broken by newer a...
متن کاملChoosing What to Protect: Strategic Defensive Allocation Against an Unknown Attacker
We study a strategic model in which a defender must allocate defensive resources to a collection of locations and an attacker must choose a location to attack. In equilibrium, the defender sometimes optimally leaves a location undefended and sometimes prefers a higher vulnerability at a particular location even if a lower risk could be achieved at zero cost. The defender prefers to allocate res...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Game Theory Review
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0219-1989,1793-6675
DOI: 10.1142/s0219198911002812