منابع مشابه
Active linking in evolutionary games.
In the traditional approach to evolutionary game theory, the individuals of a population meet each other at random, and they have no control over the frequency or duration of interactions. Here we remove these simplifying assumptions. We introduce a new model, where individuals differ in the rate at which they seek new interactions. Once a link between two individuals has formed, the productivi...
متن کاملRepeated games and direct reciprocity under active linking.
Direct reciprocity relies on repeated encounters between the same two individuals. Here we examine the evolution of cooperation under direct reciprocity in dynamically structured populations. Individuals occupy the vertices of a graph, undergoing repeated interactions with their partners via the edges of the graph. Unlike the traditional approach to evolutionary game theory, where individuals m...
متن کاملInstability in Evolutionary Games
BACKGROUND Phenomena of instability are widely observed in many dissimilar systems, with punctuated equilibrium in biological evolution and economic crises being noticeable examples. Recent studies suggested that such instabilities, quantified by the abrupt changes of the composition of individuals, could result within the framework of a collection of individuals interacting through the prisone...
متن کاملCheating in evolutionary games.
The analysis of models of evolutionary games requires explicit consideration of both evolutionary game rules and mutants which infinitesimally break these rules. For example, the Scotch Auction is an evolutionary game which lacks both a rule-obeying evolutionarily stable strategy and an asymptotically stable polymorphism of rule-obeying strategies. However, an infinitesimal rule-breaking, or ch...
متن کاملEvolutionary Games in Economics
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive o...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Theoretical Biology
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0022-5193
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.06.027