Accounting‐Based Compensation and Debt Contracts*
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Contemporary Accounting Research
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0823-9150,1911-3846
DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12574