منابع مشابه
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In practice, scoring rules elicit good probability estimates from individuals, while betting markets elicit good consensus estimates from groups. Market scoring rules combine these features, eliciting estimates from individuals or groups, with groups costing no more than individuals. Regarding a bet on one event given another event, only logarithmic versions preserve the probability of the give...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Erkenntnis
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0165-0106,1572-8420
DOI: 10.1007/s10670-012-9375-6