A unifying approach to incentive compatibility in moral hazard problems
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A unifying approach to incentive compatibility in moral hazard problems
A new approach to moral hazard is presented. Once local incentive compatibility is satisfied, the problem of verifying global incentive compatibility is shown to be isomorphic to the problem of comparing two classes of distribution functions. Thus, tools from choice under uncertainty can be brought to bear on the problem. The approach allows classic justifications of the first-order approach (F...
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Recall that the random variables are said to be (positively) affiliated if the term inside the last parentheses is always nonnegative, while they are “negatively” affiliated if the term is always nonpositive. See Milgrom and Weber (1982) and Müller and Stoyan (2002). Thus, the sign determines whether variables are positively or negatively dependent. Technically, the numerical magnitude of the t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Economics
سال: 2017
ISSN: 1933-6837
DOI: 10.3982/te2008