A unified approach to strategy-proofness for single-peaked preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Second-best Efficiency of Allocation Rules: Strategy-proofness and Single-peaked Preferences with Multiple Commodities∗
This paper studies the design of a strategy-proof resource allocation rule in economies with perfectly divisible multiple commodities and single-peaked preferences. It is known that the uniform rule is the unique allocation rule satisfying strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency, and anonymity if the number of commodity is only one and preferences are single-peaked (Sprumont (1991)). However, if ...
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In this paper, we study a resource allocation problem of economies with many commodities and single-peaked preferences. It is known that the uniform rule is the unique allocation mechanism satisfying strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency and anonymity, if the number of good is only one and pereferences are single-peaked. (Sprumont [7].) However, if the number of goods is greater than one, the s...
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In multiagent systems, we often have a set of agents each of which have a preference ordering over a set of items and one would like to know these preference orderings for various tasks, for example, data analysis, preference aggregation, voting etc. However, we often have a large number of items which makes it impractical to ask the agents for their complete preference ordering. In such scenar...
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We introduce the domain of preferences that are singlepeaked on a circle, which is a generalization of the wellstudied single-peaked domain. This preference restriction is useful, e.g., for scheduling decisions, and for one-dimensional decisions in the presence of extremist preferences. We give a fast recognition algorithm of this domain, provide a characterisation by finitely many forbidden su...
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We identify in this paper two conditions that characterize the domain of single-peaked preferences on the line in the following sense: a preference profile satisfies these two properties if and only if there exists a linear order L over the set of alternatives such that these preferences are single-peaked with respect L. The first property states that for any subset of alternatives the set of a...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SERIEs
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1869-4187,1869-4195
DOI: 10.1007/s13209-011-0064-5