A Two-Period Game Theoretic Model of Zero-Day Attacks with Stockpiling
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games
سال: 2020
ISSN: 2073-4336
DOI: 10.3390/g11040064