A Theory of Unstructured Bargaining Using Distribution-Valued Solution Concepts
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A Theory of Unstructured Bargaining using Distribution- Valued Solution Concepts
In experiments it is typically found that many joint utility outcomes arise in any given unstructured bargaining game. This suggests using a positive unstructured bargaining concept that maps a bargaining game to a probability distribution over outcomes rather than to a single outcome. We show how to “translate” Nash’s bargaining axioms to apply to such distributional bargaining concepts. We th...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1709605