A Theory of N-Person Games with Perfect Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A Closed-Form Formula for the Fair Allocation of Gains in Cooperative N-Person Games
Abstract This paper provides a closed-form optimal solution to the multi-objective model of the fair allocation of gains obtained by cooperation among all players. The optimality of the proposed solution is first proved. Then, the properties of the proposed solution are investigated. At the end, a numerical example in inventory control environment is given to demonstrate the application and t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
سال: 1953
ISSN: 0027-8424,1091-6490
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.39.6.496