منابع مشابه
A Theory of Indicative Bidding∗
When selling a business by auction, sellers typically use indicative bids – non-binding preliminary bids – to select a small number of bidders to conduct due diligence and submit binding offers. We show that if entry into the auction is costly, indicative bids can be informative: symmetric equilibrium exists in weakly-increasing strategies, with bidders “pooling” over a finite number of bids. T...
متن کاملIndicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions
Motivated by the practice of indicative bidding, which is commonly used in sales of complex and valuable assets, this paper develops a theory of two-stage auctions based on the assumption that learning valuation is costly. In various cases that characterize what can be learned in the due diligence stage, we show that no symmetric increasing equilibrium exists and hence efficient entry cannot be...
متن کاملIndicative bidding: An experimental analysis
Indicative bidding is a practice commonly used in sales of complex and very expensive assets. Theoretical analysis shows that efficient entry is not guaranteed under indicative bidding, since there is no equilibrium in which more qualified bidders are more likely to be selected for the final sale. Furthermore, there exist alternative bid procedures that, in theory at least, guarantee 100% effic...
متن کاملIndicative Bidding in Auctions with Costly Entry∗
When selling a business by auction, investment banks frequently use indicative bids – non-binding preliminary bids – to select a limited number of bidders to participate. We show that if participation is costly, indicative bids can be informative: symmetric equilibrium exists in weakly-increasing strategies, but bidders “pool” over a finite number of bids, so the highest-value bidders are not a...
متن کاملA Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your perso...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
سال: 2018
ISSN: 1945-7669,1945-7685
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20160290