A Theory of Inalienable Property Rights

A Nobel Prize for Property Rights Theory

This article provides a brief overview of the Property-Rights Theory of the firm, pioneered by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), and situates the theory in other literatures.

Intellectual Property Rights and the Theory of the Innovating Firm∗

Stronger intellectual property rights (IPRs) induce specialization and contribute to economic growth. In the United States, a sweeping pro-patent legal reform in 1982 fostered specialization and enhanced firm performance. Around the world, countries experience faster economic growth when their innovating sectors are characterized by a higher level of specialization. An endogenous growth model w...

A Genetic-DEA Approach to Reveal Property Rights Priorities

Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive o...

The level of decentralization and property rights protection––a sociological analysis of property rights

Economists have used the mechanism of interjurisdictional competition to explain how decentralization affects the degree of property rights protection. This fails however to account for another significant question: In China, can the local decentralization from the provincial level to the prefectural (county) level be more effective in protecting the private property rights of investors, especi...