A Theory of Finitely Durable Goods Monopoly with Used-Goods Market and Transaction Costs
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Consumption, Durable Goods, and Transaction Costs
We study consumption of durable and nondurable goods when the durable good is subject to transaction costs. In the model, agents derive utility from a service flow of a durable good and a consumption flow of a nondurable good. The key feature of the model is the existence of a fixed transaction cost in the durable good market. The fixed cost induces an inaction region in the purchase of the dur...
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The proof of Theorem 2 is organized as follows. First, I show that the lower bound L(x, q) (i.e., the value function of the optimal stopping problem (15)) is well defined for all q ∈ [0, 1]. Then I show that the monopolist's equilibrium profits are equal to L(x, q) for all states (x, q).
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Management Science
سال: 2001
ISSN: 0025-1909,1526-5501
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.47.11.1515.10250