A theorem on single-peaked preference functions in one dimension
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Mathematical Psychology
سال: 1977
ISSN: 0022-2496
DOI: 10.1016/0022-2496(77)90056-6