A subsidized Vickrey auction for cost sharing

A Subsidized Vickrey Auction for Cost Sharing∗

It is well-known that there is no cost-sharing mechanism that is budget balanced, efficient, and dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC). The Vickrey auction is DSIC and efficient, but raises surplus revenue. In an environment where players have constant marginal values, we introduce the subsidized Vickrey auction (SVA) that uses surplus revenue to offset some of the production costs. By ...

The Dynamic Vickrey Auction

We study the efficient allocation of a single object over a finite time horizon. Buyers arrive randomly over time, are long-lived and have independent private values. The valuation of a buyer may depend on the time of the allocation in an arbitrary way. We construct an incentive compatible mechanism in which (A) there is a single financial transaction (with the buyer), (B) ex-post participation...

A Simple Ascending Generalized Vickrey Auction∗

We design a simple ascending Vickrey auction for the combinatorial allocation problem. We make use of a concept called universal competitive equilibrium (UCE) price to design our auction. Our auction searches for a UCE price, which (along with an efficient allocation) provides enough information to compute the Vickrey payments of buyers. Our auction maintains non-linear and non-anonymous prices...

Vickrey-Dutch procurement auction for multiple items

We consider a setting where there is a manufacturer who wants to procure multiple items from a set of suppliers each of whom can supply one or more of these items (bundles). We design an ascending price auction for such a setting which implements the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves outcome and truthful bidding is an ex post Nash equilibrium. Our auction maintains non-linear and non-anonymous prices throu...

Strategic Free Information Disclosure for a Vickrey Auction