A stability index for local effectivity functions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A stability index for local effectivity functions
We study the structure of unstable local effectivity functions defined for n players and p alternatives. A stability index based on the notion of cycle is introduced. In the particular case of simple games, the stability index is closely related to the Nakamura Number. In general it may be any integer between 2 and p. We prove that the stability index for maximal effectivity functions and for m...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical Social Sciences
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0165-4896
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.12.003