منابع مشابه
Mechanism Design with Common Values
vi = θ1 + θ2 Assume for simplicity that the θi are i.i.d. random variables with a continuous density on [0, 1]. How would you bid in a first price auction? How would you bid in a second price auction? Does the second price auction have dominant strategy equilibria? Does the game have other equilibria that are similar to dominant strategy equilibria in some sense? Analysis of the first price auc...
متن کاملSequential bargaining with common values∗
We study the alternating-offers bargaining problem of assigning an indivisible and commonly valued object to one of two players who jointly own this object. The players are asymmetrically informed about the object’s value and have veto power over any settlement. There is no depreciation during the bargaining process which involves signalling of private information. We characterise the perfect B...
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Vote-tabulation audits can be used to collect evidence that the set of winners (the outcome) of an election according to the machine count is correct—that it agrees with the outcome that a full hand count of the audit trail would show. The strength of evidence is measured by the p-value of the hypothesis that the machine outcome is wrong. Smaller p-values are stronger evidence that the outcome ...
متن کاملSpatial Dependence with Common Factors: A Case Study of Growth in Iran's Provinces
The economic components of a geographic region, such as its economic growth, are influenced by the spillover effect of other regions’ economic components. In addition to these spatial dependences, there are common factors, such as oil price, that induce a correlation among the economic variables of the geographic regions. Thus, it is necessary to distinguish between the dependence created by th...
متن کاملSocial Learning with Private and Common Values
We consider an environment where individuals sequentially choose among several actions. The payoff to an individual depends on her action choice, the state of the world, and an idiosyncratic, privately observed preference shock. Under weak conditions, as the number of individuals increases, the sequence of choices always reveals the state of the world. This contrasts with the familiar result fo...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Contributions in Theoretical Economics
سال: 2006
ISSN: 1534-5971
DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1269