A social functional approach to emotions in bargaining: When communicating anger pays and when it backfires.
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A social functional approach to emotions in bargaining: when communicating anger pays and when it backfires.
Previous research on the communication of emotions has suggested that bargainers obtain higher outcomes if they communicate anger than if they communicate happiness because anger signals higher limits, which in turn leads opponents to give in. Building on a social functional account of communicated emotions, the authors demonstrate that the behavioral consequences of communicated anger strongly...
متن کاملWhen Punishment Pays
Explaining cooperation in groups remains a key problem because reciprocity breaks down between more than two. Punishing individuals who contribute little provides a potential answer but changes the dilemma to why pay the costs of punishing which, like cooperation itself, provides a public good. Nevertheless, people are observed to punish others in behavioural economic games, posing a problem fo...
متن کاملthe relationship between language and social capital in ilami kurdish: a sociopragmatic approach
چکیده زبان به عنوان یک وسیله در ایجاد و بازسازی سرمایه اجتماعی در چند دهه گذشته مورد توجه بوده است. اگر چه درباره سرمایه اجتماعی و سازه های مربوط به آن زیاد نوشته شده است ولی خیلی کم بر روی اینکه چطور زبان می تواند باعث ایجاد اعتماد یا بی اعتمادی بشود مطالعه ای انجام شده است. این مطالعه به منظور تحقق دو هدف انجام گرفته است. اول تلاش خواهد شد تا یک گونه شناسی از واژگانی که مردم کرد زبان شهر ا...
15 صفحه اولSocial justifications for moral emotions: when reasons for disgust are less elaborated than for anger.
In the present research, we tested the unreasoning disgust hypothesis: moral disgust, in particular in response to a violation of a bodily norm, is less likely than moral anger to be justified with cognitively elaborated reasons. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to explain why they felt anger and disgust toward pedophiles. Participants were more likely to invoke elaborated reasons, vers...
متن کاملWho Pays When Auction Rules
In many negotiations, rules are soft in the sense that the seller and/or buyers may break them at some cost. When buyers have private values, we show that the cost of such opportunistic behavior (whether by the buyers or the seller) is borne entirely by the seller in equilibrium, in the form of lower revenues. Consequently, the seller is willing to pay an auctioneer to credibly commit to a mech...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1939-1315,0022-3514
DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.94.4.600