A Simple Tool for Qualitatively Testing, Quantitatively Measuring, and Normatively Justifying Savage's Subjective Expected Utility
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A Simple Tool for Qualitatively Testing, Quantitatively Measuring, and Normatively Justifying Savage’s Subjective Expected Utility
This paper introduces a new preference condition that can be used to justify (or criticize) expected utility. The approach taken in this paper is an alternative to Savage’s, and is accessible to readers without a mathematical background. It is based on a method for deriving “comparisons of tradeoffs” from ordinal preferences. Our condition simplifies previously-published tradeoff conditions, an...
متن کاملJustifying conditionalization: Conditionalization maximizes expected epistemic utility
According to Bayesian epistemology, the epistemically rational agent updates her beliefs by conditionalization: that is, her posterior subjective probability after taking account of evidence X, pnew, is to be set equal to her prior conditional probability pold(·/X). Bayesians can be challenged to provide a justification for their claim that conditionalization is recommended by rationality — whe...
متن کاملJustifying conditionalisation: conditionalisation maximizes expected epistemic utility
According to Bayesian epistemology, the epistemically rational agent updates her beliefs by conditionalisation: that is, her posterior subjective probability after taking account of evidence X, pnew, is to be set equal to her prior conditional probability pold(·|X). Bayesians can be challenged to provide a justification for their claim that conditionalisation is recommended by rationality — whe...
متن کاملClassical subjective expected utility.
We consider decision makers who know that payoff-relevant observations are generated by a process that belongs to a given class M, as postulated in Wald [Wald A (1950) Statistical Decision Functions (Wiley, New York)]. We incorporate this Waldean piece of objective information within an otherwise subjective setting à la Savage [Savage LJ (1954) The Foundations of Statistics (Wiley, New York)] a...
متن کاملReference-dependent subjective expected utility
A reference-dependent generalisation of subjective expected utility theory is presented. In this theory, preferences between acts depend both on final outcomes and on reference points (which may be uncertain acts). It is characterised by a set of axioms in a Savage-style framework. A restricted form of the theory separates attitudes to end states (encoded in a ‘satisfaction function’) from atti...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
سال: 2004
ISSN: 0895-5646
DOI: 10.1023/b:risk.0000016140.72468.f7