منابع مشابه
A family of supermodular Nash mechanisms implementing Lindahl allocations
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economic Theory
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1097-3923
DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12028