A Simple O(log log(rank))-Competitive Algorithm for the Matroid Secretary Problem
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A Simple $O(\log\log(\mathrm{rank}))$-Competitive Algorithm for the Matroid Secretary Problem
Only recently progress has been made in obtaining o(log(rank))-competitive algorithms for the matroid secretary problem. More precisely, Chakraborty and Lachish (2012) presented a O( √ log(rank))-competitive procedure, and Lachish (2014) later presented a O(log log(rank))competitive algorithm. Both these algorithms and their analyses are very involved, which is also reflected in the extremely h...
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The Matroid Secretary Problem, introduced by Babaioff et al. (2007), is a generalization of the Classical Secretary Problem. In this problem, elements from a matroid are presented to an on-line algorithm in a random order. Each element has a weight associated with it, which is revealed to the algorithm along with the element. After each element is revealed the algorithm must make an irrevocable...
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15 صفحه اولOn a Competitive Secretary Problem
Consider a scenario in which there are multiple employers competing to hire the best possible employee. How does the competition between the employers affect their hiring strategies or their ability to hire one of the best possible candidates? In this paper, we address this question by studying a generalization of the classical secretary problem from optimal stopping theory: a set of ranked emp...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematics of Operations Research
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0364-765X,1526-5471
DOI: 10.1287/moor.2017.0876