A simple “market value” bargaining model for weighted voting games: characterization and limit theorems
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A simple "market value" bargaining model for weighted voting games: characterization and limit theorems
We offer a bargaining model for weighted voting games that is a close relative of the nucleolus and the kernel. We look for a set of weights that preserves winning coalitions that has the property of minimizing the difference between the weight of the smallest and the weight of the largest Minimum Winning Coalition. We claim that such a set of weights provides an a priori measure of a weighted ...
متن کاملForthcoming in slightly revised version in International Journal of Game Theory, 2007 A Simple “Market Value” Bargaining Model for Weighted Voting Games: Characterization and Limit Theorems
Feld, Grofman and Ray (2003) offer a bargaining model for weighted voting games that is a close relative of the nucleolus and the kernel. They look for a set of weights that preserves winning coalitions that has the property of minimizing the difference between the weight of the smallest and the weight of the largest Minimum Winning Coalition. They claim that such a set of weights provides an a...
متن کاملBargaining , Voting and Value ∗
This paper addresses the following issue: If a set of agents bargain on a set of feasible alternatives ’under the shadow’ of a voting rule, that is, any agreement can be enforced if a ’winning coalition’ supports it, which general agreements are likely to arise? In other terms: Which is the influence that the voting rule used to settle agreements can project on the outcome? To give an answer we...
متن کاملLegislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting
Organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting. We analyze this setting using a noncooperative bargaining game based on the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model. Unlike analyses derived from cooperative game theory, we find that each voter’s expected payoff is proportional to her voting weight. An exception occurs when many high-weight voters exist, as low-weight voters may expect disp...
متن کاملLimit Theorems for Markets with Sequential Bargaining*
This paper models trade as a non-coopertative, strategic game played at an inlinite sequence of dates. A single, indivisible commodity is traded. Buyers and sellers have transferable utility and are characterized by their reservation utilities. They meet at random and “bargain” over the price at which a single unit of the good will be exchanged. Under a variety of circumstances it is shown that...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-006-0055-0