منابع مشابه
A Selling Mechanism*
For the assignment game, we propose the following selling mechanism: sellers, simultaneously, fix their prices first; then buyers, sequentially, decide which object to buy, if any. The first phase of the game determines the potential prices, while the second phase determines the actual matching. We prove that the set of subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies in the strong sense of the me...
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This paper finds an optimal mechanism for selling a good to a buyer who may be budget-constrained. We consider a seller with one unit of a good facing a buyer with a quasilinear utility function. If the buyer does not face a binding budget constraint, textbook monopoly pricing is optimal. By contrast, the possibility of a binding budget constraint can make it optimal for the seller to use nonli...
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We study a dynamic buyer-seller problem in which the good is information and there are no property rights. The potential buyer is reluctant to pay for information whose value to him is uncertain, but the seller cannot credibly convey its value to the buyer without disclosing the information itself. Information comes as divisible hard evidence. We show how and why the seller can appropriate a su...
متن کاملSelling to Strategic Customers: Opaque Selling Strategies
Over the past few years, firms in the travel and entertainment industries have begun using novel sales strategies for revenue management. In this chapter, we study a selling strategy called opaque selling, in which firms guarantee one of several fully specified products, but hide the identity of the product that the consumer will actually obtain until after the purchase is completed. Several fi...
متن کاملResearch Note - Optimal Mechanism for Selling a Set of Commonly Ranked Objects
This paper designs the optimal mechanism for selling a set of commonly-ranked objects. While buyers rank these objects in the same order, the rates at which their valuations change for a less-preferred object might be different. Four stylized cases are identified according to this difference: “parallel,” “convergent,” “divergent,” and “convergent then divergent.” The optimal mechanism imposes a...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Revista Brasileira de Economia
سال: 2003
ISSN: 0034-7140
DOI: 10.1590/s0034-71402003000400012