A Security Formal Verification Method for Protocols Using Cryptographic Contactless Smart Cards

Verification of a Formal Security Model for Multiapplicative Smart Cards

We present a generic formal security model for operating systems of multiapplicative smart cards. The model formalizes the main security aspects of secrecy, integrity, secure communication between applications and secure downloading of new applications. The model satisfies a security policy consisting of authentication and intransitive noninterference. The model extends the classical security m...

Analysis of OPACITY and PLAID Protocols for Contactless Smart Cards

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Formal Verification of Cryptographic Protocols

Formal Verification of Cryptographic Protocols: A Survey

In this paper we give a survey of the state of the art in the application of formal methods to the analysis of cryptographic protocols. We attempt to outline some of the major threads of research in this area, and also to document some emerging trends. : : :

Modelling Security Protocols based on Smart Cards

Security protocols based on smart cards lack formal analysis. The theoretic analysis by Bellare & Rogaway is the best example in this small eld. We propose an alternative approach obtained as an extension to Paulson's Inductive Approach, which is based on theorem proving. Our model certainly relies on a consistently smaller formal overhead, but carries adequate expressiveness allowing smart car...