A Risk-averse Employee Scheduling with Uncertainty Demand
نویسندگان
چکیده
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IFAC-PapersOnLine
سال: 2019
ISSN: 2405-8963
DOI: 10.1016/j.ifacol.2019.11.521