A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Online Appendix for Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
Proof. First we prove the “if” direction. Fix agent 1 and preferences ✓1. Suppose that S1 is not obviously dominant in G = hH, , A,A, P, c, (Ii)i2N , gi. We need to demonstrate that there exists G̃ that is i-indistinguishable from G, such that G,G̃(S1) is not weakly dominant in G̃ . We proceed by construction. Let (S0 1, I1, h sup, S 1 , d sup c , hinf , Sinf 1, d inf c ) be such that I1 2 ↵(S1, S...
متن کاملQuantum Bayesian implementation and revelation principle
Bayesian implementation concerns decision making problems when agents have incomplete information. This paper proposes that the traditional sufficient conditions for Bayesian implementation shall be amended by virtue of a quantum Bayesian mechanism. In addition, by using an algorithmic Bayesian mechanism, this amendment holds in the macro world. More importantly, we find that the revelation pri...
متن کاملStable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof
Many two-sided matching markets, from labor markets to school choice programs, use a clearinghouse based on the applicant-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, which is well known to be strategy-proof for the applicants. Nonetheless, a growing amount of empirical evidence reveals that applicants misrepresent their preferences when this mechanism is used. This paper shows that no mechanism th...
متن کاملA Revelation Principle for Competing Mechanisms
In modelling competition among mechanism designers, it is necessary to specify the set of feasible mechanisms. These specifications are often borrowed from the optimal mechanism design literature and exclude mechanisms that are natural in a competitive environment, for example, mechanisms that depend on the mechanisms chosen by competitors. This paper constructs a set of mechanisms that is univ...
متن کاملThe Revelation Principle
The strategic interactions among the designer of a mechanism and its participants can be modeled as a multi-stage game. The designer moves first by selecting a mechanism. The participants observe the mechanism, and move thereafter. For ease of exposition, we restrict our present attention to a two-stage game, in which the participants play a simultaneous-move (i.e., one-shot) game in the second...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.09.010