A Revelation Principle for Competing Mechanisms

A Revelation Principle for Competing Mechanisms

In modelling competition among mechanism designers, it is necessary to specify the set of feasible mechanisms. These specifications are often borrowed from the optimal mechanism design literature and exclude mechanisms that are natural in a competitive environment, for example, mechanisms that depend on the mechanisms chosen by competitors. This paper constructs a set of mechanisms that is univ...

A Note on Competing Mechanisms and the Revelation Principle

A Relevation Principle for Competing Mechanisms

In modelling competition among mechanism designers, it is necessary to specify the set of feasible mechanisms. These speci...cations are often borrowed from the optimal mechanism design literature and exclude mechanisms that are natural in a competitive environment; for example, mechanisms that depend on the mechanisms chosen by competitors. This paper constructs a set of mechanisms that is uni...

Indirect Mechanisms and the Revelation Principle

Example 1.3. The English auction consists of a number of rounds. On round k = 1, 2, . . ., the auctioneer offers the good at price p = ke, asking all bidders if they are interested in the good at that price. The auction continues so long as more than one bidder is interested. The auction terminates, say at round t, when either exactly one or no bidders remain interested. If there is one interes...

On the Revelation Principle and Reciprocal Mechanisms in Competing Mechanism Games

This paper shows how to characterize the set of outcomes functions that can be supported as equilibrium outcome functions in competing mechanism games. We describe a set of mechanisms we refer to as reciprocal mechanisms. It is show that the set of outcome functions supportable as equilibria in a game in which principals offer reciprocal mechanisms is the same as the set of outcomes supportable...