A recursive core for partition function form games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Implementation of the Recursive Core for Partition Function Form Games∗
In partition function form games, the recursive core (r-core) is implemented by a modified version of Perry and Reny’s (1994) non-cooperative game. Specifically, every stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SSPNE) outcome is an r-core outcome. With the additional assumption of total r-balancedness, every r-core outcome is an SSPNE outcome.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theory and Decision
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0040-5833,1573-7187
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-007-9030-x