منابع مشابه
Does Rationality Give Us Reasons?
Most of us take it for granted that we ought to be rational—to have the bundle of dispositions and abilities that constitute the faculty of rationality. Most of us also take it for granted that we ought to satisfy various individual requirements of rationality: we ought not to believe it is Monday and also believe it is not Monday; we ought to intend to catch the 12.50, if we intend to get to a...
متن کاملA puzzle about withholding
This paper presents a puzzle about justification and withholding. The puzzle arises in a special case where experts advise us to not withhold judgment. My main thesis is simply that the puzzle is genuinely a puzzle, and so leads us to rethink some common assumptions in epistemology, specifically assumptions about the nature of justification and doxastic attitudes. Section 1 introduces the commo...
متن کاملReason, Reasons, and Reasoning: A Constructivist Account of Human Rationality
The concept of rationality has its roots in a historic philosophical conception of human beings as creatures of reason. To act on the basis of reason is to act on the basis of reasons, which in turn implies a process of reasoning. An objectivist conception of rationality sees its essence as lying in the use of reasoning processes that conform to appropriate logical norms. A subjectivist concept...
متن کاملKeep Things in Perspective: Reasons, Rationality and the a Priori
Factualism is a view about normative reasons. 2 A normative reason for acting is a consideration which favours performing an action, perhaps by revealing a respect in which so acting is good or right. A reason, so understood, can be pro tanto. A pro tanto reason has a weight and (so) can be weighed against or alongside other reasons. For example, that a new Coen brothers’ film is showing might ...
متن کاملA puzzle about belief updating
In recent decades much literature has been produced on disagreement; the puzzling conclusion being that epistemic disagreement is, for the most part, either impossible (e.g. Aumann (Ann Stat 4(6):1236–1239, 1976)), or at least easily resolvable (e.g. Elga (Noûs 41(3):478–502, 2007)). In this paper I show that, under certain conditions, an equally puzzling result arises: that is, disagreement ca...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Journal of Ethics
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1382-4554,1572-8609
DOI: 10.1007/s10892-016-9239-4