A Prior-Free Spectrum Auction for Approximate Revenue Maximization
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Computer Journal
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0010-4620,1460-2067
DOI: 10.1093/comjnl/bxx022