A Price Discrimination Model of Trade Promotions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A Price Discrimination Model of Trade Promotions
C have long faulted the wide-spread practice of trade promotions as wasteful. It has been estimated that this practice adds up to $100 billion worth of inventory to the distribution system. Yet, the practice continues. In this paper, we propose a price discrimination model of trade promotions. We show that in a distribution channel characterized by a dominant retailer, a manufacturer has incent...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Marketing Science
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0732-2399,1526-548X
DOI: 10.1287/mksc.1070.0314