A PGM framework for recursive modeling of players in simple sequential Bayesian games
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چکیده
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Opponent modeling in a PGM framework
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0888-613X
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijar.2010.01.015