A Permissivist Defense of Pascal’s Wager

نویسندگان

چکیده

Epistemic permissivism is the thesis that evidence can rationally permit more than one attitude toward a proposition. Pascal’s wager idea ought to believe in God for practical reasons, because of what gain if theism true and has lose false. In this paper, I argue epistemic true, then defender powerful responses two prominent objections. First, about theistic belief. Second, show how belief dispels objections wager: objection wagering impossible, epistemically impermissible.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Erkenntnis

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['0165-0106', '1572-8420']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-021-00454-1